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PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR THE RAPE COMPLAINANT:
HALF A FIG LEAF*
I. INTRODUCTION
The most common privacy protections afforded to complainants of
sexual assault or rape are widely known as "rape shield laws."' These
shields were enacted to protect the privacy of complainants within the
courtroom by reducing or filtering the introduction of evidence regarding
the complainant's prior sexual history.2 Advocates of rape shield laws be-
lieved that such protections would lead to increased reporting rates for sex
crimes.3 Rape shield laws have been created by every state4 and enforced at
the federal level through rules governing evidence.5 However, evidentiary
protections alone do not fully address the privacy concerns of many rape
complainants. 6 For the majority of rape complainants, extrajudicial privacy
remains a paramount concern.7
Efforts to secure extrajudicial privacy protections have not led to the
same legal guarantees of privacy as efforts to protect complainants within
the courtroom. 8 Only three states have created statutes criminalizing
*Winner of a North Dakota State Bar Foundation Outstanding Note/Comment Award.
1. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2002 8 tbl. 6 (2003), available at http://www.rainn.org/ncvs_2002.pdf (reporting
that in 2002 the primary victims of sexual assault or rape were females aged sixteen to nineteen
years, while females aged twenty to twenty-four years experienced the second highest rates of
rape or sexual assault). This note focuses on rape shields designed to protect female, adult com-
plainants of sex crimes. The term "rape" will be used in the note to include both sexual assault
and rape.
2. Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for
the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 764-65 (1986).
3. Id. at 767.
4. State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243, 265 n.1 (N.J. 2003) (Coleman, J., dissenting).
5. FED. R. EVID. 412.
6. See Deborah W. Denno, The Privacy Rights of Rape Victims in the Media and the Law:
Perspectives on Disclosing Rape Victim's Names, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113, 1130 (1993)
(citing findings of the National Women's Study that seventy-eight percent of rape victims
surveyed favored legislation prohibiting media reporting of victims' names).
7. Id.
8. Michelle Johnson, Of Public Interest: How Courts Handle Rape Victim's Privacy Suits, 4
COMM. L. & POL'Y 201, 210-12 (1999). However, the rape law reform movement of the 1970s
influenced the news media by convincing editors to cease publishing the names of rape victims.
Id. at 210.
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publication of a rape victim's identity. 9 The United States Supreme Court
found two previous applications of such statutes unconstitutional. 10
In 1984, the United States Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Law held
a hearing on privacy concerns of rape complainants in the face of
burgeoning media coverage of rape trials." Two decades later, the question
of extrajudicial privacy protections remains unresolved while advances in
communications technology leave some rape complainants stripped of
virtually all privacy.
12
This note offers an overview of current practices and changing thought
concerning the relevance and validity of privacy protections, both inside
and outside the courtroom, afforded to complainants of sex crimes. The re-
lationship between rape shield laws, conceived primarily as evidentiary
rules for trial, and the minimal protections granted the rape complainant
outside the courtroom will be emphasized. Special focus will be directed
towards issues of publishing information identifying complainants because
this represents an area where the law has not kept pace with changes in
media reporting and communications technology.13
Because every state and the federal government have adopted some
form of rape shield, this note will briefly survey the commonalties and
differences among such laws, focusing on the evolution of North Dakota's
9. Shirley A. Wiegand, Sports Heroes, Sexual Assault and the Unnamed Victim, 12 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 501, 501 (2001) (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-23 (1999) (overruled by Dye v.
Wallace, 553 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. 2001)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (West 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. §
16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 1985)). The Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee is currently conducting
hearings on privacy for rape complainants. Matt Benson, Rape Victims Ask Lawmakers for
Greater Protections, FORT COLLINS COLORADOAN, Jan. 29, 2004, at lB. It is possible that
legislation protecting complainant privacy may be passed in Colorado during 2004. Id.
10. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975) (striking on First and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds a Georgia statute providing civil liability for media publishers of a rape
victim's name that had been obtained through proper means from court records); The Florida Star
v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 540 (1989) (declining to allow the imposition of criminal liability under
Florida statute when a newspaper lawfully obtained the victim's name through accidental
disclosure by law enforcement).
II. Impact of Media Coverage of Rape Trials: Hearing on Oversight on the Effect of
Publicity on the Victims in Rape Cases, and the Right of the Press to have Access to Such
Proceedings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong. (1984) [hereinafter Hearings].
12. See, e.g., JAVDAN Report, Kobe Watch (on file with author) (publishing the name,
address, phone number, email, and photographs of the nineteen-year-old woman allegedly raped
by professional basketball player Kobe Bryant, with photographs of the hotel room in which the
alleged rape occurred and biographical information regarding the complainant and her family).
13. Wiegand, supra note 9, at 502-03, 513. Professor Wiegand notes that while statutory
protections vary depending on jurisdiction, traditional media outlets often withhold a com-
plainant's name. Id. at 502. But the Internet provides an easy means of disseminating information
about complainants, allowing individuals or nontraditional media organizations to publish such
information. Id. at 513. This creates pressure on traditional media outlets to "follow suit" and
publish information that is becoming widely available through the Internet. Id.
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shield laws.' 4 Recent court decisions impacting such protections will also
be described. The uncertain status of privacy guarantees outside the court-
room will be addressed by examining the few United States Supreme Court
decisions impacting such protections.
II. RAPE SHIELD LAWS: EVIDENTIARY PROTECTIONS
A. DEVELOPMENT OF RAPE SHIELD LAWS
1. History of the Rape Law Reform Movement
Most current rape shield laws were enacted through a legal reform
movement in the 1970s and 1980s produced by dissatisfaction with then-
existing rape laws and concern regarding a sharp increase in the number of
reported rapes. S The reform movement has been described as a powerful,
albeit coincidental, confluence of feminism with national concerns re-
garding "law and order" and public safety.16 Women's organizations, led
by the National Organization of Women's Task Force on Rape, police and
prosecutors, and associated legal and social organizations successfully
lobbied state legislatures and Congress to enact reform legislation.17
Among the resulting evidentiary reforms were the dismantling of traditional
requirements of corroboration of a rape complainant's testimony, and the
use of jury instructions requiring that such testimony be cautiously
scrutinized. 18
Prominent among the reforms was the creation of rape shields designed
to protect complainants from broad defense inquiries into the complainant's
sexual history to support a defense of consensual sex. 19 Historically, such
inquiries were uncurtailed 2O and even encouraged by scholars of evidence
law.21
14. N.D. R. EvID. 412 (superseding N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14 (1997) and N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-20-15 (1997)).
15. CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION
AND ITS IMPACT 20 (1992).
16. Galvin, supra note 2, at 797; see also Cristina Carmody Tilley, A Feminist Repudiation
of the Rape Shield Laws, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 45, 48 (2002) (citing an alignment of feminists with
Nixon-era politicians to support rape shield laws).
17. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 15, at 20.
18. Galvin, supra note 2, at 769-70.
19. Frank Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape Shield Laws, 50 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1245, 1247 (1989).
20. Id.
21. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 62 at 130 (3d
ed. 1940) (stating that because the complainant's lack of consent is a material element of the
NOTE
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Emphasis on a rape complainant's nonconsent was unique within
American law.22 Nonconsent was historically an element of many crimes,
but it was only in rape cases that "nonconsent" was defined.
23 It was
required to be manifested through marked physical resistance.
24
Traditionally, nonconsent was related to issues of the complainant's
credibility and chaste moral character. 25 The Missouri Supreme Court held
it a matter of common knowledge that lack of chastity in a man "does not
even in the remotest degree affect his character for truth ... while it does
that of a woman." 26
Chastity was required of a complainant because it was believed to be a
character trait that could predispose a woman towards resisting improper
sexual contacts. 27 Conversely, unchaste women were presumed to have
consented to the alleged rape.28 The complainant's prior sexual history,
therefore, could be used to prove consent.
29
2. Rationales For and Against Rape Shields
Rape law reformers advocating the enactment of shields advanced
several arguments in support of such laws.30 A fundamental goal was to
enhance the dignity of complainants during the reporting and prosecution of
sex crimes. 31 For many complainants, the trial experience was "almost as
degrading as the rape itself." 32 Defense cross-examinations regarding the
complainant's prior sexual history were often wide-ranging and
crime, "the character of the woman as to chastity is of considerable probative value in judging the
likelihood of that consent").
22. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 29 (1987).
23. Id.
24. id. at 29-30 (citing Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (Wis. 1906) (holding that the
victim failed to demonstrate "the most vehement exercise of every physical means or faculty...
shown to persist until the offense is consummated")).
25. Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent
and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 51, 74-75 (2002).
26. Id. at 75 (citing State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (Mo. 1895) (distinguishing between
lack of chastity in men and women by noting that "many great and noble men" such as Lord
Byron were unchaste)).
27. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 15, at 25.
28. Anderson, supra note 25, at 76.
29. Id. Professor Anderson notes that in the 1970s, some courts began to limit evidence
regarding chastity if the defendant did not use a consent defense, or if consent was implausible,
such as when a complainant was "severely beaten." Id. at 79-80.
30. S PoHN & HORNEY, supra note 15, at 20-21.
31. See Galvin, supra note 2, at 764 (describing support in the United States House of
Representatives for legislation to prevent embarrassment and harassment of rape complainants
during cross-examinations by defense counsel).
32. Id.
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unnecessarily intrusive. 33 For example, subjects such as the complainant's
use of contraception or adulterous relationships were permitted.34
Advocates of rape shields believed that ensuring the privacy and
dignity of complainants during criminal prosecution would help to increase
reporting of such crimes.35 Research conducted during the 1970s estimated
the ratio of unreported to reported rapes ranged from two-to-one, to ten-to-
one, and even as high as twenty-to-one. 36
Related to the goal of increased reporting rates was the desire to ensure
greater success in the prosecution of rape cases. 37 Rape shield advocates
argued that in order to secure higher conviction rates, prejudicial evidence
about the complainant's prior sexual history or morality should be limited
or excluded.38 Juries tended to reflect a long-standing bias against sexually
active women, which was exacerbated by the introduction of sexual history
evidence. 39 This bias led to reluctance to convict in cases where such
evidence had been introduced,40 and it supported a "she got what she
deserved" basis for acquittal. 41
For some advocates, a vital justification for rape shields was to
promote the efficacy and proper functioning of evidentiary burdens.42 They
argued that a complainant's sexual history was irrelevant for either proving
her credibility or proving that she consented to the defendant's acts. 43
Issues of consent were better determined by scrutinizing the parties'
conduct during the alleged rape.44
However, opponents of rape shields argued that they could impinge on
defendants' constitutional rights and curtail their abilities to effectively
33. Id. at 794.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 767.
36. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 15, at 18. Feminist legal scholars have noted that prob-
lems in defining the crime of rape likely led to substantial underreporting of such statistics by
authorities. Id. (citing ESTRICH, supra note 22, at 10).
37. Galvin, supra note 2, at 767.
38. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 15, at 41.
39. Id. (citing H. S. FIELD & L. B. BIENSEN, JURORS AND RAPE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY
AND LAW 103 (1980)); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 70 (1966).
40. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 39, at 254; Galvin, supra note 2, at 796-97 and accom-
panying notes (discussing the methods and findings of KALVEN & ZEISEL).
41. Galvin, supra note 2, at 793.
42. See id. at 792-93 (describing the effect of then-existing common law as shifting the focus
of rape trials from the offenders' conduct to the "moral worth" of the complainant).
43. Anderson, supra note 25, at 88.
44. Id. at 89 (citing Privacy of Rape Victims: Hearing on H.R. 14666 Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 24 (1976) (testimony of
D.C. Superior Court Judge Sylvia Bacon)).
NOTE
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defend themselves against allegations of rape.45 Early critics such as the
American Civil Liberties Union and the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers 46 warned of the impact of rape shields on Sixth
Amendment protections afforded to defendants.4 7
The focus of their concerns was the defendant's right to cross-examine
an accuser and the right to call witnesses. 48 Overbroad rape shields could
undermine these protections.49 For example, in cases where the parties had
engaged in prior consensual sexual conduct and the defendant used a
consent defense, relevant evidence regarding the complainant's sexual
history could document the complainant's "mindset towards the accused."50
Because the majority of rapes are not "stranger rapes," but are committed
by parties known to the complainant, issues of prior sexual conduct
between the parties are common.51 Additionally, in cases where the
defendant denied the charges and argued that evidence of the alleged rape
resulted from the complainant's sexual relations with another person, the
complainant's history could clarify the presence of such evidence and issues
of identity.52
B. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Congress considered, but did not approve, a federal rape shield in
1976.53 At that time, over half of the states had already enacted their own
versions of rape shields.54 Two years later, Congress passed a slightly
revised version of the rape shield legislation,55 amending the Federal Rules
45. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 15, at 21.
46. Tilley, supra note 16, at 52-53. The American Civil Liberties Union later supported rape
shield legislation. Id. at 50-60.
47. Galvin, supra note 2, at 802. The confrontation clause allows the defendant "to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him;" while the compulsory process clause allows the defendant
"to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
48. Galvin, supra note 2, at 802.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Dean G. Kilpatrick, Rape and Sexual Assault, Nat'l Violence Against Women
Prevention Center, at: http://www.nvaw.org/research/sa.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (reporting
findings of the National Women's Study that "only 22% of rape victims were assaulted by
someone they had never seen before or did not know well").
52. Id.
53. H.R. 14666, 94th Cong. (1976); Anderson, supra note 25, at 86. The proposed legisla-
tion prohibited evidence of the complainant's past sexual behavior except in cases where it was
used to identify the source of physical evidence such as semen or where it related to past sexual
relations with the defendant. Id.
54. Galvin, supra note 2, at 808; see infra Part Il.C for a discussion of state approaches to
rape shields.
55. See Anderson, supra note 25, at 86 (describing the addition of a "constitutional catch-all"
exception).
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of Evidence to include privacy guarantees for complainants. 56 Entitled the
"Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act," the legislation received broad
support in both houses. 57 The legislation was embodied in Rule 412 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which has since been amended twice to broaden
its scope and to clarify its application. 58
Rule 412 governs admissibility of evidence in any civil or criminal
proceeding involving allegations of sexual misconduct.59 Any evidence
offered regarding the complainant's other sexual activity or sexual pre-
disposition is inadmissible unless it falls under one of the few enumerated
exceptions and is properly determined to be admissible.60
In criminal cases, the rule permits admission of such evidence only
under three circumstances. 6 1 First, evidence can be used to prove issues of
identity, showing "specific instances" of the complainant's sexual behavior
that indicate a third party, not the accused, was the actual source of semen,
injury, or other physical evidence.62 Secondly, in cases where a consent
defense is offered and the complainant and the defendant had a prior sexual
relationship, evidence of specific instances of such sexual behavior between
them may be offered by the defense or prosecution. 63 Finally, the evidence
is admissible when the constitutional rights of the defendant would be
violated by its exclusion.64
Rule 412 is less specific in its guidance on the admission of evidence
of the complainant's past sexual activity or supposed sexual predisposition
56. FED. R. EvID. 412.
57. Anderson, supra note 25, at 91.
58. FED. R. EvID. 412. The 1988 amendment substituted the term "sex offense" for "rape"
and the more extensive 1994 amendment broadened the shield to all criminal cases (including
those in which rape is not charged) and to civil cases, providing a new exception for admissibility
in civil cases, and granting the complainant the right to be heard at in camera hearings regarding
admissibility. FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's note.
59. FED. R. EVID. 412(a).
60. Id. § (a)(l)-(2).
61. Id. § (b)(l).
62. See id. § (b)(1)(A) (permitting "evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen,
injury, or other physical evidence").
63. See id. § (b)(1)(B) (permitting "evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the
alleged victim with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the accused
to prove consent or by the prosecution").
64. See id. § (b)(l)(C) (permitting "evidence the exclusion of which would violate the
constitutional rights of the defendant"). However, federal appellate courts rarely find Rule 412's
constitutional exception violated. E.g. United States v. Powell, 226 F.3d 1181, 1198-99 (10th Cir.
2000). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of evidence of the minor victim's alleged sexual
acts with other parties. Id. The court noted that given the nature of important governmental inter-
ests of protecting the victim against invasion of privacy, embarrassment, and stereotyping, the
exclusion of the evidence was not "sufficiently weighty to warrant finding a constitutional
violation." Id. at 1199.
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in civil litigation.65 Such evidence may be admitted if it is both admissible
under the Federal Rules and its probative value "substantially outweighs"
the risk of harm to the complainant and the risk that it will create unfair
prejudice against any party.66 The Rules offer added protections against the
introduction of evidence regarding the complainant's reputation by pro-
hibiting admissibility unless the complainant herself has placed this issue
"in controversy." 67
A party seeking to introduce evidence falling within the exceptions
provided for criminal and civil cases must follow a certain procedure to
determine admissibility.68 The moving party must file a written motion
specifically describing the evidence and their purpose for offering it at least
fourteen days prior to trial. 69 The party must notify the complainant (or
where appropriate, her guardian or representative) and serve the motion on
all parties.70 The court is then required to conduct an in camera hearing
allowing the complainant and defendant to attend and to be heard.
7'
Contents of this proceeding and materials related to it must be sealed until
the court orders otherwise.
72
C. STATE STATUTES AND RULES OF EVIDENCE
Rape shields represented in state statutes and rules of evidence display
"sweeping differences." 73 Over half the states enacted shields prior to the
federal rape shield law, and many states modeled their shields on or in
65. FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(2). Evidence may be used for the following:
"to prove the sexual behavior or... predisposition of any alleged victim... if it is
otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs
the danger of harm... and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged





68. Id. § (c).
69. Id. § (c)(1)(A). The rule requires the movant to "file a written motion at least 14 days
before trial specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered un-
less the court, for good cause requires a different time for filing or permits filing during trial." Id.
70. Id. § (c)(1)(B). The movant must "serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged
victim, or, when appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or representative." Id.
71. Id. § (c)(2). "Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must conduct a hearing
in camera and afford the victim and parties a right to attend and be heard." Id.
72. Id. "The motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain
under seal unless the court orders otherwise." Id.
73. Andrew Z. Soshnick, Comment, The Rape Shield Paradox: Complainant Protection




opposition to the legislation enacted by early reformers such as Michigan.74
States combining elements of Michigan's law with other state models have
sought to reconcile liberal statutory enactments with more conservative
forms of rape shields granting wide judicial discretion. 75 A minority of
states, including North Dakota, have followed or adapted Rule 412, which
represents another moderate course between "diametrically opposed" rape
shields created through explicit statutes or judicial discretion. 76
1. Varied State Approaches
The influential "Michigan approach" 77 generally prohibits introduction
of evidence of the complainant's sexual history, absent explicit enumerated
74. Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 1248. Enacted in 1974, Michigan's rape shield states:
(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of
the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct
shall not be admitted under sections 520b to 520g unless and only to the extent that the
judge finds that the following proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in the
case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative
value:
(a) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the actor.
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin
of semen, pregnancy, or disease.
(2) If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b),
the defendant within 10 days after the arraignment on the information shall file a
written motion and offer of proof. The court may order an in camera hearing to
determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1). If new
information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence
described in subsection (1)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge may order an in camera
hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection
(1).
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.5200) (West 1991); see also Jeanette R. Buttrey, Michigan's
Rape-Shield Statute and the Admissibility of Evidence that a Child Complainant has been
Previously Molested, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 391, 396-402 (1998) (outlining the Michigan rape
shield's legislative history).
75. Soshnick, supra note 73, at 644.
76. Galvin, supra note 2, at 883.
77. Id. at 812 passim, app. tbl.1 at 906-07. These states followed the Michigan approach:
ALA. CODE § 12-21-203 (1995) (superseded by ALA. R. EVID. 412); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
794.022(2)-(3) (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (1999); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 725 §
5/115-7 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-4 (Bums 1998); KY. REV. STAT. § 510.145
(Michie 1985) (superseded by KY. R. EVID 412); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:498 (West 1981)
(superseded by LA. CODE. EviD. ANN. art. 412 (West 1996); ME. R. EVID. 412; MD. ANN. CODE
§ 3-319 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 21B (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.520j (West 1991); MINN. R. EvID. 404(c) (renumbered MINN. R. EVID. 412); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 491.015 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-511 (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-321
(1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (1996); N.C. R. EVID. 412; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2907.02(D) (Page 2002); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3104 (West 2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
659.1 (West 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-17-119 (1982) (superseded by TENN. R. EVID. 412);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3255 (Lexis 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Michie 1996); W.VA.
CODE § 61-8B-11 (2003); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 972.11(2), 971.31(11) (West 1998). Galvin, supra
note 2, at 883, app. tbl. 1 at 904-05. Professor Galvin's landmark article was the first to categorize
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exceptions. 78 These exceptions usually include evidence concerning prior
sexual relations between the complainant and defendant and evidence of the
complainant's prior history offered as an alternate explanation for the
presence of semen or other physical results of alleged rape.79 When parties
seek admission of evidence under an enumerated exception, they must
follow mandatory procedures including written notice and in camera
hearings to determine the admissibility of such evidence. 80
A limited number of states chose an approach opposite that of
Michigan by creating shields that rely on the use of in camera hearings to
determine admissibility of evidence instead of adhering to black letter
"substantive evidentiary exclusions."8 Typified by Arkansas' approach,
these rape shields depend on judicial discretion to ensure that evidence
admitted is relevant and that its probative value is sufficient to outweigh
any prejudicial effect.82 Such laws reflect traditional evidentiary standards
regarding relevance and prejudice impact. 83
state rape shields into four broad groups based on approaches of leading jurisdictions: the
Michigan, Texas, California, and federal approaches. Id.
78. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §750.520(j) (West 1991); see also Tuerkheimer, supra note
19, at 1248.
79. Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 1248.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1248-49.
82. Id. Tuerkheimer notes that Texas was formerly among this group. Id. at 1248 n.27.
Represented among this group are: ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.045 (Michie 2003); ARK. CODE. ANN.
§ 16.42.101 (Michie 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407 (Bradford 2002); IDAHO CODE §
18.6105 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3525 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:84A-32.1-3
(West 1994) (amended by N.J. STAT. ANN. §2C:14-7 (West 2002); N.M.R. Evid. 413 and N.M.
Stat. Ann. 30-9-16 (Michie 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
23A-22-15 (Michie 1998); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-312 (Lexis 2003). Galvin, supra note 2, app.
tbl. 1 at 907 (referencing the above as the "Texas approach").
83. Soshnick, supra note 73, at 653. The Arkansas rape shield prohibits in criminal
prosecutions:
(b) ... opinion evidence, reputation evidence, or evidence of specific instances of the
victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person, evidence of a
victim's prior allegations of sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person,
which allegations the victim asserts to be true, or evidence offered by the defendant
concerning prior allegations of sexual conduct by the victim with the defendant or any
other person if the victim denies making the allegations is not admissible by the
defendant, either through direct examination of any defense witness or through cross-
examination of the victim or other prosecution witness, to attack the credibility of the
victim, to prove consent or any other defense, or for any other purpose.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101 (Michie 2000). However, this prohibition is subject to the
exception that:
(c) Notwithstanding the prohibition contained in subsection (b) of this section,
evidence directly pertaining to the act upon which the prosecution is based or evidence
of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person may be




California adopted a complex, bifurcated approach, which was
followed by several other states, initially including North Dakota.84 This
approach generally prohibits evidence relating to the complainant's consent,
while admitting evidence concerning the complainant's credibility follow-
ing an in camera determination of its relevance. 85 Generally, evidence
regarding the complainant's prior sexual history may be introduced only to
document previous relations with the defendant.86
North Dakota's statutory rape shield was first enacted in 1975.87 The
shield broadly prohibited the introduction in criminal proceedings for
(1) A written motion shall be filed by the defendant with the court at any time
prior to the time the defense rests stating that the defendant has an offer of
relevant evidence prohibited by subsection (b) of this section and the purpose for
which the evidence is believed relevant;
(2)(A) A hearing on the motion shall be held in camera no later than three (3)
days before the trial is scheduled to begin, or at such later time as the court may
for good cause permit.
(B) A written record shall be made of the in camera hearing and shall be
furnished to the Arkansas Supreme Court on appeal.
(C) If, following the hearing, the court determines that the offered proof is
relevant to a fact in issue, and that its probative value outweighs its
inflammatory or prejudicial nature, the court shall make a written order
stating what evidence, if any, may be introduced by the defendant and the
nature of the questions to be permitted in accordance with the applicable
rules of evidence; and
(3)(A) If the court determines that some or all of the offered proof is relevant to
a fact in issue, the victim shall be told of the court's order and given the
opportunity to consult in private with the prosecuting attorney.
(B) If the prosecuting attorney is satisfied that the order substantially
prejudices the prosecution of the case, an interlocutory appeal on behalf of
the state may be taken ....
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101 (Michie 2000).
84. See Galvin, supra note 2, at 894 passim, app. tbl. 1 at 907-08 (describing the following as
the California approach: CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(b) (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§3508, 3509 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-68, 97-3-70 (2000) (§ 97-3-70 repealed 1991,
but remaining largely embodied in MISS. R. EVID. 412); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 48.069, 50.090
(2002); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-20-14 to 15.1 (Michie 1997) (superseded by N.D. R.
EvlD. 412); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 750 (West 1995) (renumbered as tit. 12, § 2412 (1992));
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (West 2000)).
85. Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 1250; see also People v. Chandler, 56 Cal. App. 4th 703,
708-09 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that through "sparing" application, the credibility exception
has "not been allowed" to "undermin[e] ... legislative intent to limit public exposure of the vic-
tim's prior sexual history" and is most commonly applied in cases where the victim habitually
engaged in prostitution or the exchange of sex for drugs).
86. Galvin, supra note 2, at 894; see also Chandler, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 711 (upholding the
trial court's exclusion of testimony by a nonparty, former boyfriend of the complainant about her
willingness to exchange sex for drugs "which would have little or no bearing on the victim's
willingness to exchange sex for drugs on a routine basis").
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-15 (1997). The
shield outlined that in a criminal prosecution:
I.... opinion evidence, reputation evidence, and evidence of specific instances of the
complaining witness' sexual conduct, or any of such evidence, is not admissible on
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sexual imposition or gross sexual imposition 88 of evidence regarding the
complainant's character or reputation. 89 Evidence of the complainant's
behalf of the defendant to prove consent by the complaining witness. This subsection
shall not be applicable to evidence of the complaining witness' sexual conduct with
the defendant.
2. If the prosecuting attorney introduces evidence, including testimony of a witness, or
the complaining witness... and such evidence or testimony relates to the complaining
witness' sexual conduct, the defendant may cross-examine the witness who gives such
testimony and offer relevant evidence limited specifically to the rebuttal of such
evidence introduced by the prosecuting attorney or given by the complaining witness.
3. This section shall not be construed to make inadmissible any evidence offered to
attack the credibility of the complaining witness in the manner authorized by law, by
rule of procedure, or by the court in the interests of justice in accordance with the
procedure provided in section 12.1-20-15 ....
If the defendant sought to impeach the complainant's credibility, his efforts were governed by the
following:
1. A written motion shall be made... to the court and prosecuting attorney stating that
the defense has an offer of proof of the relevancy of evidence of the sexual conduct of
the complaining witness proposed to be presented and its relevancy in attacking the
credibility of the complaining witness.
2. The written motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit in which the offer of proof
shall be stated.
3. If the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient, the court shall order a hearing
out of the presence of the jury, if any, and at such hearing allow the questioning of the
complaining witness regarding the offer of proof made by the defendant.
4. At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds that evidence proposed to be
offered by the defendant... is relevant in accordance with section 12.1-20-14 and is
not legally inadmissible, the court may make an order stating what evidence may be
introduced by the defendant, and the nature of the questions to be permitted. The
defendant may then offer evidence pursuant to the order of the court.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14 (1997).
88. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-04 (Supp. 2003). The following defines the offense of
sexual imposition as:
A person who engages in a sexual act or sexual contact with another, or who causes
another to engage in a sexual act or sexual contact, is guilty of a class B felony if the
actor:
1. Compels the other person to submit by any threat that would render a person
of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting; or
2. Engages in a sexual act or sexual contact with another, whether consensual or
not, as part of an induction, initiation, ceremony, pledge, hazing, or qualification
to become a member or an associate of any criminal street gang ....
Id.
The offense of gross sexual imposition is defined as:
1. A person who engages in a sexual act with another, or who causes another to
engage in a sexual act, is guilty of an offense if:
a. He compels the victim to submit by force or by threat of imminent
death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping, to be inflicted on any human
being;
b. That person or someone with that person's knowledge has substantially
impaired the victim's power to appraise or control the victim's conduct by
administering or employing without the victim's knowledge intoxicants, a
controlled substance.., or other means with intent to prevent resistance;
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sexual history was admissible if documenting sexual conduct with the
defendant. 90 However, should the prosecution or any prosecution witness
introduce sexual history evidence, the defendant was permitted to cross
examine that witness and introduce relevant evidence to make a rebuttal.9'
The procedure for a defendant's introduction of sexual history evidence
required a written motion accompanied by an affidavit offering proof of the
relevancy of such evidence in attacking the complainant's credibility. 92 The
court would consider the sufficiency of this proof.93 If sufficient, an in
camera hearing would be held where the complainant could be
questioned. 94 Should the court be convinced of the relevance 95 and admis-
sibility of the evidence, it would prepare an order informing the defendant
of what evidence could be introduced and "the nature of the questions to be
permitted." 96 The shield contained no exception allowing admission of
evidence if necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.97
c. He knows that the victim is unaware that a sexual act is being
committed upon him or her;
d. The victim is less than fifteen years old; or
e. He knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the other person
suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders him or her incapable
of understanding the nature of his or her conduct.
2. A person who engages in sexual contact with another, or who causes another
to engage in sexual contact, is guilty of an offense if:
a. The victim is less than fifteen years old; or
b. He compels the victim to submit by force or by threat of imminent
death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping, to be inflicted on any human
being.
3. An offense under this section is a class A felony if in the course of the offense
the actor inflicts serious bodily injury upon the victim or if his conduct violates
subdivision a or d of subsection 1. Otherwise the offense is a class B felony.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03 (1997).
89. Id. § 12.1-20-14(1).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 12.1-20-14(2).
92. Id. § 12.1-20-15(1)-(2).
93. Id. § 12.1-20-15(3).
94. Id.
95. State v. Osier, 1999 ND 28, 5 6, 590 N.W.2d 205, 208. The North Dakota Supreme
Court explained that the prosecution's introduction of medical evidence proving penetration
makes other evidence identifying sources of penetration other than the defendant "highly
relevant." Id. (citing State v. Reinart, 440 N.W.2d 503, 505 (N.D. 1989)).
96. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-15(4) (1997).
97. Id. However, this rape shield never faced any substantive challenge to its consti-
tutionality. See State v. Brickzin, 319 N.W.2d 150, 151 (N.D. 1982) (declining to address the
defendant's argument the shield violated the separation of powers doctrine when the defendant
failed to raise, or to even confront, this issue at trial); Osier, 1999 ND 28, 1 33, 590 N.W.2d at
215 (declining to address an unsupported separation of powers argument and noting that "mere
reference to a statute's constitutionality, with nothing more, does not meet the standard of
persuasion required" (citing City of Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 377 (N.D. 1994)).
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North Dakota expanded its statutory shield in 1993 to include issues of
the complainant's manner of dress at the time of the alleged crime.98 The
complainant's dress was generally inadmissible absent a court finding of
admissibility. 99 Courts were required to first determine whether the com-
plainant's dress was a material fact and whether the probative value of such
evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.100 If the evidence was material
and highly probative, the court would assess its relevance and admis-
sibility.101 The procedure for determining relevance and admissibility was
similar to that used for sexual conduct evidence: an offer of proof, in
camera hearing, followed by a court order.102
2. Adapting Federal Rule 412 in North Dakota
Although it was enacted after the majority of states had created their
own rape shields, Federal Rule 412 has had a lingering effect on state rape
law reforms. A limited number of states chose to follow or adapt this
model initially,103 while others adapted the Federal Rule for shields created
decades later. 104 Other states, including North Dakota, have closely
scrutinized the model when revising their own evidentiary law.105
The North Dakota Supreme Court's Joint Procedure Committee ex-
tensively debated Proposed Rule 412, modeled on the federal rape shield, in
1996.106 Initially, much discussion focused on the applicability of the
proposed rape shield to both criminal and civil proceedings. 07
Committee members noted that in hostile work environment sexual
harassment claims, evidence of the complainant's dress or verbal conduct
could be relevant in determining the "welcomeness" of the alleged
advances.108 The Committee referenced the United States Supreme Court's
98. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-15.1 (1997).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 12.1-20-15.1(J).
101. Id. § 12.1-20-15.1(2).
102. Id. However, there is no recorded opinion indicating application of this statute.
103. Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 1249 n.30 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86f
(West 2001); HAWAII R. EvID. 412; IOWA R. EVID 412; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42
(McKinney 2003); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.210 (2002); TEx. R. CRIM. EvID. 412).
104. UTAH R. EVID. 412, adopted 1994; Diane Obritsch, Recent Development: Utah Adopts
Rule of Evidence 412: Prohibiting Public Exposure of a Victim's Sexual Past, 21 J. CONTEMP. L.
96, 99-100 (1995).
105. North Dakota Supreme Court Joint Procedure Committee Minutes (Sept. 26-27, 1996;
Apr. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Minutes] at: http://www.court.state.nd.us/Court/JP/Minutes/
Sept1996.htm and http://www.court.state.nd.us/Court/JPMinutes/Apri1996.htm (last visited Oct.
1,2003).
106. Id.




reluctance to extend such protections to civil cases. 109 Committee members
argued that a rape shield should be limited to criminal cases because civil
litigants sought monetary gain, and civil litigation did not afford "pre-
liminary screening" of complaints, as does the criminal justice system.110
Proponents of a rape shield applicable only in criminal cases prevailed."'I
The Committee broadened the use of the rape shields in criminal
cases. 112 Under North Dakota's then-existing statutes, the shield was ap-
plied only in cases where the defendant was charged with either sexual
imposition or gross sexual imposition.113 The Committee expanded the
shield's protection to any criminal proceeding where sexual misconduct
was alleged. 14
Lack of specificity in the existing statutory shield was a concern
frequently noted by the Committee.115 The statutes were described as "con-
fusing" 116 and "not very concrete" in enumerating exceptions for admitting
evidence."17 The Committee expressed its preference for the enumerated
exceptions of the proposed federal model over the relevancy tests outlined
by then-existing state statutes.1 18
The Committee's extensive discussions resulted in the adoption of a
new rule of evidence in 1998.119 North Dakota's Rule 412 applied only to
criminal cases (reflecting the United States Supreme Court's proposed
rule), but otherwise mirrored the provisions of the federal rape shield
enacted by Congress.120 North Dakota adopted the Federal Rule's express
inadmissibility of evidence offered as proof of the complainant's sexual
history or predisposition unless it fell under three enumerated exceptions. 121
Reiterating the Federal Rule, evidence used to identify alternate sources of
physical evidence, evidence of prior consensual sexual relations, and
evidence which, if excluded, would violate the defendant's constitutional
109. Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986) (describing the Title
VII sexual harassment plaintiffs alleged provocative speech and dress as potentially relevant in
determining whether alleged sexual advances were unwelcomed)).
110. Id. at *14.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *14-*15.
113. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14 (1997).
114. Minutes, supra note 105, at *14-*15 (Apr. 25, 1996); N.D. R. EVID. 412(a)-(b).
115. Minutes, supra note 105, at *15 (Apr. 25, 1996).
116. Minutes, supra note 105, at *5 (Sept. 26-27, 1996).
117. Minutes, supra note 105, at *15 (Apr. 25, 1996).
118. Id.
119. N.D. R. EVID. 412.
120. Minutes, supra note 105, at *5 (Sept. 26-27, 1996).
121. N.D.R. EVID. 412(a)-(b).
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rights, were all admissible.122 Finally, the procedures used to determine
admissibility were identical to those required under the federal shield,
including requirements of an in camera hearing affording a hearing
opportunity for the complainant. 123
D. RECENT CASE LAW
1. Balancing Competing Interests
Given the diversity of rape shields, it is not surprising that such laws
have engendered differing challenges over the past three decades.124
Scholars have noted that highly exclusionary shields, such as the Michigan
approach, have most often proven problematic on constitutional grounds. 25
Lacking the "catchall" constitutional exception found in the federal
approach, the Michigan approach creates difficulty in balancing a com-
plainant's privacy interests against a defendant's ability to present relevant
evidence. 126
The Supreme Court addressed this debate in 1991 in Michigan v.
Lucas. 27 The defendant was convicted for the knifepoint rape and beating
of his former girlfriend.128 He used a consent defense at trial, but failed to
comply with notice requirements of Michigan's rape shield statute and was
therefore prevented from introducing evidence of the parties' prior sexual
conduct.129 The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, hold-
ing that the statute's procedural requirements of notice and in camera
hearings were unconstitutional "in all cases" where used to preclude the
defendant from introducing evidence of the parties' past sexual conduct. 130
122. Id. § (b).
123. Id. § (c).
124. See Soshnick, supra note 73, at 655.
125. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 1259-61 (describing the inability of highly exclu-
sionary shields to predict and encompass all "possible instances" where sexual history evidence
might become relevant).
126. Id. at 1260. In one case, exclusion of the complainant's prior sexual history prevented
the defendant from showing the complainant had previously been arrested twice for prostitution,
and her attempts to hide her activities from her mother created a possible motive for false rape
allegations. Id. (citing State v. Hemdon, 426 N.W.2d 347, 350 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988)).
127. 500 U.S. 145 (1991).
128. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 146; see also Lara English Simmons, Michigan v. Lucas: Failing to
Define the State Interest in Rape Shield Legislation, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1592, 1598 (1992) (arguing
that the holding failed to consider broader state interests advanced by rape shields such as
promoting impartial truth-seeking).
129. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 147- 48.
130. Id. at 148.
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This broad finding of unconstitutionality triggered review by the Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari. 131
The Supreme Court held that while the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights may be implicated, such rights are not unlimited.32 The right to
introduce relevant testimony could, in appropriate cases, yield to
accommodate legitimate state interests.133 The Michigan statute repre-
sented legitimate interests such as protection of complainants against
"surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy."' 34 Its pro-
cedural requirement ensured that evidence of prior sexual relationships
could be properly investigated by prosecutors and its materiality and pro-
bative value assessed by the court.135 The Supreme Court explained that it
had upheld notice requirements in "analogous settings," such as a
defendant's use of alibi witnesses.136
The Court also reiterated its previous holdings excluded that under
certain circumstances, probative evidence could properly be excluded when
the defendant failed to comply with valid discovery rules. 137 While the
Court had not previously granted a blanket endorsement to the exclusion of
evidence, it had stated that exclusion was appropriate when lesser penalties
"would perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice to the State and the harm
to the adversary process."138
Potentially admissible evidence of consent occurs not only in the form
of verbal or physical interactions between the parties, but also in verbal or
written statements by complainants to third parties.139 In Lewis v. Wilkin-
son,140 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that special caution
was needed when the defendant sought to admit evidence in the form of
diary entries written by the complainant after an alleged rape. 141 The
complainant began a diary at the encouragement of her rape crisis
counselor.142 Portions of the diary were anonymously copied and sent to
the defendant, after which the state produced the entire diary for in camera
131. Id. at 145.
132. Id. at 149.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 149-50.
135. Id. at 150.
136. Id. (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85 (1970)).
137. Id. at 151-52 (citing U.S. v. Noble, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975)).
138. Id. at 152 (citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 413 (1988)).
139. State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243, 261 (N.J. 2003) (citing People v. Ivers, 587 N.W.2d 10,
12-15 (Mich. 1998); Commonwealth v. Killen, 680 A.2d 851, 852-53 (Pa. 1996); Villfranco v.
State, 313 S.E.2d 469, 473 (Ga. 1984)).
140. 307 F.3d 413 (6th Cir. 2002).
141. Lewis, 307 F.3d at 416.
142. Id. at 417.
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review.143 The trial court, applying Ohio rape shield law, allowed into
evidence only restricted portions of the diary, excluding statements such as
"I'm not a nympho like all those guys think. I'm just not strong enough to
say no... I'm tired of being a whore. This is where it ends."144
On appeal, the defendant argued that such statements had been
improperly excluded.14 5 The writing could be interpreted as either direct or
implied proof of the complainant's consent.146 The defense also contended
that the passage suggested a possible motive for the complainant to pursue a
false claim; the complainant was unhappy that she had acquiesced in
previous sexual encounters with other men. 147
The Sixth Circuit considered the impact of this exclusion on the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.148 Defendants are entitled to make
particular attacks on the creditability of prosecution witnesses to reveal
potential "biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives." 149 The court held that the
excluded statements were reasonably interpreted as evidence of consent or
motive. 150 Their omission infringed on the defendant's constitutional
protections. 151
The Supreme Court held that the constitutional concerns were
paramount and merited admission of the evidence.152 To prevent undue
prejudice against the complainant, the Court instructed the trial court to
closely supervise remand proceedings. 53 The trial court could admit the
evidence after issuing a cautionary instruction and strictly limiting "the
scope of cross examination."
54
2. Struggling to Define "Sexual Conduct"
Courts in various jurisdictions continue to struggle to define what
constitutes admissible prior sexual conduct with a defendant.155 The line
between overt physical or verbal flirtation and actual sexual conduct was
143. Id.
144. Id. at 417-18. The Ohio rape shield being applied has been described as following the
Michigan approach. Galvin, supra note 2, at 812, app. tbl. I at 906-07.
145. Lewis, 307 F.3d at 418.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 419.
149. Id. (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)).
150. See id. at 421 (noting that the complainant's remark "I'm just not strong enough to say
no to them" could be understood as indication of consent).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 422.
153. Id. at 422-23.
154. Id. at 422.
155. State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243, 252 (N.J. 2003) (Coleman, J., dissenting).
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central, but remained unaddressed, in the controversial New Jersey
Supreme Court case of State v. Garron.156 In Garron, the complainant
(J.S.) and defendant allegedly had regular contact in her office workplace
until March 1997, substantially prior to the alleged rape in September
1998.157 Defense witnesses described the complainant as touching, in-
appropriately, brushing up against the defendant, and making repeated
innuendoes or "come-on remarks."158 The trial court largely excluded such
evidence, holding that the conduct was "flirtatious.... not sexual." 159 The
defendant was convicted and appealed.160
The New Jersey Appellate Division closely considered the impact of
this exclusion.161 It found that this evidence was properly excluded because
it lacked enough specificity to "be probative of whether a reasonable
person" would conclude from it that the complainant "freely and
affirmatively" consented to the alleged crime. 162 The appellate court agreed
with the trial court's finding that the conduct described in the evidence had
not been taken seriously by the parties. 163 Even if improperly excluded, the
omission of such evidence was harmless error because the jury heard
defense testimony that on two separate occasions the parties had kissed, and
J.S. had allegedly "grabbed [his] rear end" in a third incident.164
The New Jersey Supreme Court reached a different decision.165 It
began by considering the rape shield's broad definition of sexual conduct,
which included any sexually related activities of the victim, not limited to
sexual contact. 166 Relevance of such contact depended on whether it was
probative of whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would
believe the complainant "freely and affirmatively" permitted the alleged
crime. 167
Moreover, the evidence had to be both highly material and its probative
value sufficient to outweigh any prejudice or invasion of the complainant's
156. 827 A.2d 243 (N.J. 2003).
157. Garron, 827 A.2d at 247.
158. Id. at 247-50.





164. Id. at 247.
165. Id. at 246.
166. Id. at 254.
167. Id.
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privacy.168 If the evidence concerned events occurring more than one year
before the offense, it was presumed inadmissible. 
169
However, the court warned against a mechanical application of
evidentiary laws.170 The defendant's constitutional protections could not be
undermined by exclusion of "relevant evidence necessary to" his defense.
171
To permit the exclusion of such evidence would dilute the integrity of the
fact-finding process.172 The court concluded that "the admission of the evi-
dence is constitutionally compelled" if the evidence was relevant and
required for a fair judicial process.1
73
The court noted that J.S.'s verbal and physical behavior could be
interpreted differently. 74 It might be seen as "office buffoonery" and
"bawdy humor" or as a "thinly-veiled cover for her sexual advances" made
in aggressive pursuit of the defendant. 175 A jury was well-placed to in-
terpret such behavior. 176 Since the defendant's state of mind "was critical"
to a jury determination, the exclusion of evidence regarding J.S.'s behavior
created a fragmented and distorted picture of their interactions.
77
Additionally, there was no reason for the complainant to expect her past
relationship with the defendant to remain private, as much of it had been
conducted in public.178
Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court found it unnecessary to
distinguish flirtatious speech or acts from sexual conduct because the
nonsexual conduct might be admissible under general evidentiary rules.
179
However characterized, the evidence regarding their relationship was
"inextricably intertwined."' 80 The entirety of the evidence was needed for a
just determination of the case.181
An opposite conclusion was reached by the Montana Supreme Court in
State v. Detonancour,82 where the court found that differentiating between
168. Id.
169. Id. at 255 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C: 14-7(b) (West 1995)).
170. Id. at 256.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 229-33 (1988)).
174. Id. at 258.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 259.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 261.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 34 P.3d 487 (Mont. 2001).
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a single incident of alleged flirtation or sexual conduct was essential.183 In
Detonancour, the defendant argued that the exclusion of evidence regarding
prior interactions with the complainant was an abuse of the trial court's
discretion.18 4 The evidence consisted of testimony that two days prior to
the rape, at the complainant's birthday party, she "pulled him onto her
lap."1 85 The defendant argued that the rape was a result of this prior "sexual
conduct" in which "she led him on."1 86
The Montana Supreme Court refused to define this evidence as "sexual
conduct."1 87 Adhering to the plain meaning of the statute, the court noted
that only "sexually intimate" behavior between the parties would be
admissible under the state's rape shield law.188 The excluded evidence
merely documented flirtation, and "flirtatious behavior is not ... an
invitation to engage in sexual relations."189 To have admitted such evi-
dence would have put the complainant on trial, directing examination to the
"nuances" of her behavior.190 According to the court, Montana's rape
shield was designed to prevent exactly such a possibility.191
III. PRIVACY PROTECTIONS OUTSIDE THE COURTOOM
A. INCREASED MEDIA COVERAGE OF RAPE TRIALS CREATES
INCREASED CONCERNS FOR COMPLAINANT PRIVACY
Over the last three decades, courts have applied rape shields to afford
complainants some degree of increased privacy inside the courtroom. 192 At
the same time, changes in media coverage of rape trials and
communications technology have resulted in increased media reporting
about such trials.193 This has led to greater public distribution of infor-
mation identifying complainants without their consent. 194 Experts testifying
before a 1984 United States Senate subcommittee hearing on the media's





188. Id. The Montana rape shield has been described as following the Michigan approach.
Galvin, supra note 2, at 812, app. tbl.1 at 906-07.
189. State v. Detonancour, 34 P.3d 487, 491 (Mont. 2001).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Anderson, supra note 25, at 54-55.
193. LISA M. CUKLANZ, RAPE ON TRIAL: HOW THE MASS MEDIA CONSTRUCT LEGAL
REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 7, 10 (1996).
194. Ellen Goodman, A Weakened Privacy Shield for Rape Accusers, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), July 31, 2003, at A 17.
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impact on rape trials warned of a possible chilling effect: "[W]ith the ex-
ploitation of rape by the media, victims will again think long and hard
before going into a courtroom."
195
1. The Loss of Traditional Privacy Protection by the Media
The hearing was prompted by the introduction of live cable television
coverage of rape trials during the 1980s. 196 During coverage of a Massa-
chusetts gang-rape trial, the complainant was identified by name by various
media outlets, including CNN.197 This breached a tradition of self-restraint
by the American media; news organizations had chosen not to publish
complainants' names "either at the time the rape is reported or when the
victim testifies at trial." 198 A decade later, in 1991, the question of iden-
tifying complainants was raised again when NBC News and The New York
Times followed the lead of tabloids and identified the complainant in the
William Kennedy Smith case.199
Today, mainstream media reporting on the rape proceedings against
athlete Kobe Bryant display "a kind of technical virginity," disclosing de-
tailed identifying information about his complainant's appearance,
residence, and background, while withholding her name.200 However, nu-
merous Internet sites provide this information. 201 According to rape law
scholar Susan Estrich, "Anonymity is, you have to go online or listen to the
radio to find out a person's name as opposed to just turning on the TV."202
2. Rationales For and Against Disclosing Names of
Complainants
The question whether identities of rape complainants should be made
public is a difficult one, and both sides offer numerous arguments for their
position.203 Criminal defense experts argue that withholding identities
195. Hearings, supra note 11, at 53 (statement of Jennifer Barr).
196. See id. at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, Chair, Comm. on the Judiciary)
(citing coverage of the gang rape at Big Dan's Tavern in New Bedford, Mass).
197. Id. at 5 (statement of Ronald A. Pina, District Attorney, Bristol District, Mass.).
198. Denno, supra note 6, at 1113.
199. Id. The Palm Beach, Florida, rape trial of William Kennedy Smith received national
attention primarily as a "celebrity trial" because of the defendant's membership in the Kennedy
family. CUKLANZ, supra note 193, at 8.
200. Goodman, supra note 194, at A17; Kate Zernike, What Privacy: Everything Else But
the Name,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2003, § 4, at 4.
201. Goodman, supra note 194, at A 17.
202. Zernike, supra note 200, § 4, at 4.




unfairly burdens defendants.204 According to Professor Alan Dershowitz,
an anonymous accusation creates a two-fold problem.2 05 First, it implies
that the complainant actually was a victim, and second, it reduces the
defendant's presumption of innocence.2 06
Proponents of shielding identities counter that the complainant's
privacy should be paramount in order to improve reporting rates.207 One
longitudinal, national statistical study of adult women and rape has found
that the overwhelming majority of rape victims supported nondisclosure,
stating that nondisclosure would increase their likelihood of reporting
rape. 208 Of 522 organizations that counsel rape victims, 97% reported that
laws guaranteeing nondisclosure of identities would increase victim
reporting of rape.209 However, the most recent federal statistics on crime
indicate that even absent such protections, the reporting of rape (and all
violent crime except aggravated assault) has increased between 1992 and
2002.210 These findings may not yet be conclusive, and they "should be
interpreted cautiously given the small sample size." 211
Proponents of nondisclosure also argue that the social stigma of rape
should preclude identification of rape complainants.2 12 Because the ma-
jority of rapes are committed by acquaintances or relatives,2 13 it is often
presumed that women consented to the act.214 Therefore, complainants fear
the reaction of friends, family, and the community.2 15
It is the conflict between freedom of the press and complainants' desire
for privacy that has created the most legal impact.2 16 The Supreme Court
204. Id. at 1129-30.
205. Id. at 1129 (citing Alan M. Dershowitz's Letter to the Editor, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2,
1984, at 10).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1130.
208. Id.
209. Kilpatrick, supra note 51, at http://www.nvaw.org/research/sa.shtml (last visited Oct. 2,
2003).
210. RENNISON & RAND, supra note 1, at 11. In 2003, reporting rates reached 53.7%; while
in 1993, less than 30% of rapes were reported. Id.
211. Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN), RAINN News: New Report Shows
Dramatic Willingness to Report Rape to Police, at: http://www.rainn.org/ncvs2002.html (last
visited Sept. 30, 2003); see generally Stacy Futter & Walter R. Mebrane, Jr., The Effects of Rape
Law Reform on Rape Case Processing, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 72, 103-10 (2001) (outlining
a broad statistical survey of the impact of various rape law reforms on case processing).
212. Denno, supra note 6, at 1125.
213. Kilpatrick, supra note 51, at http://www.nvaw.org/research/sa.shtml (last visited Oct. 2,
2003).
214. Denno, supra note 6, at 1125.
215. Id.
216. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975); The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 537 (1989).
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has twice weighed these conflicting priorities. 217  Its decisions have
indicated that concern of a free press is generally paramount, but there may
be occasions where the complainants' interests would prevail.
218
B. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS REGARDING FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS: OPENING THE DOOR TO EXTRAJUDICIAL PROTECTIONS
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,219 the Supreme Court first
confronted the balance of a rape complainant's privacy and press
freedom.220 The case arose in Georgia, one of few states with statutes
criminalizing the publication of identifying information. 221 After attending
a high school party and drinking to the point of unconsciousness, the
seventeen-year-old victim was raped by other teenage partygoers.222 She
did not regain consciousness and choked to death.223 Local television sta-
tions reporting the proceedings against six defendants repeatedly broadcast
the decedent's name, obtained from court documents, and showed her high
school yearbook photograph.224 This disclosure created distress for the
victim's family, especially when confronting public support for the
numerous defendants. 225
The decedent's father sued the station for monetary damages, claiming
that Georgia's statute should be construed to grant him a civil cause of
action.226 Georgia's Supreme Court held otherwise, but it determined that
the father had a claim for common law invasion of his own privacy because
of the publication of his daughter's name.2 27 The broadcasting company
maintained that the victim's identity was a matter of public interest;
therefore, the First and Fourteenth Amendments protected its disclosure.
228
The United States Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the
broadcaster.229 The Court framed its considerations narrowly, focusing
217. Id.
218. Johnson, supra note 8, at 203.
219. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
220. Cox Broad., 420 U.S. at 469 (1975).
221. Wiegand, supra note 9, at 502 n.10 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-23 (1999) (overruled
by Dye v. Wallace, 553 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. 2001)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.03 (West 2000); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 1985)). Wisconsin also had such a statute, which was
repealed in 1976 following Cox. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 942.02 (West 1958).
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specifically on whether sanctions could be imposed for the accurate
publication of a rape victim's name obtained "from judicial records which
[were] maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which
themselves [were] open to public inspection." 230
The Court stated that the press was especially important to the
functioning of the judiciary because the press "serves to guarantee the
fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny
upon the administration of justice." 23' The Court concluded that by placing
the victim's name within court records, Georgia presumed it was acting in
the public interest. 232
To create liability for disclosure of a rape victim's name could have a
chilling effect upon the press. 233 This would be highly undesirable, prompt-
ing "timidity and self-censorship and very likely lead to suppression of
many items that would otherwise be published and that should be made
available to the public." 234 When privacy interests are involved in judicial
proceedings, the Court recommended that states utilize means to avoid
public exposure of private information, but not sanction the press for
disseminating truthful information already disclosed by the government. 235
In its next major case regarding publication of a rape complainant's
identity, the Court upheld publication when the information was inad-
vertently disclosed by a single government document.236 In The Florida
Star v. B.J.F.,237 a rare state statute criminalized such disclosure.238 The
sheriff's department in this case placed police reports in its pressroom,
which contained signs clearly stating that "names of rape victims were not
matters of public record, and were not to be published."239 The police
report documenting B.J.F.'s knifepoint rape inadvertently contained her
name.240 A Florida Star trainee copied the report verbatim, which was
230. Id. at 491.
231. Id. at 492 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)).
232. Id. at 495.
233. Id. at 496.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526-27 (1989).
237. 491 U.S. 524 (1988).
238. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 524. The statute made it a misdemeanor to "print, publish, or
broadcast, or cause or allow [the same] ... in any instrument of mass communication the name,
address, or other identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual offense." FLA. STAT.
§ 794.03 (West 1987).
239. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 527.
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edited into article format by a reporter. 24 1 The article was published nine
days after the crime, while the rapist was still at large.
242
The complainant filed suit against both the sheriff's department and the
newspaper, alleging negligent violation of the state's statute prohibiting
disclosure. 243 The department settled before trial, and the newspaper un-
successfully sought dismissal on First Amendment grounds.244 At trial,
B.J.F. testified that acquaintances and fellow workers brought the article to
her attention and that her mother received phone calls threatening to rape
B.J.F. again, which prompted B.J.F. to relocate and seek police pro-
tection.245 The trial court denied repeated motions for directed verdict from
the newspaper, instead holding negligence per se and granting a directed
verdict to B.J.F.246 The Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed, and
the Florida Supreme Court denied discretionary review.2 47
The United States Supreme Court determined that Florida Star was
"appropriately analyzed" under narrow First Amendment principles 248
previously set out by the Court's 1979 holding in Smith v. Daily Mail.249 In
Daily Mail,250 the Court addressed the constitutionality of newspaper
publication of information about juvenile defendants. 251 The Court deter-
mined in Daily Mail that "[i]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful
information about a matter of public significance then state officials may
not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to
further a state interest of the highest order."252
In applying the Daily Mail test, the Court found that The Florida Star
had lawfully obtained accurate information about B.J.F.253 While the police
report was not itself a public record, it was not unlawful for the newspaper
to inspect the police report.2 54 The Court also held that the Star's article
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 528.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 546 (White, J. dissenting).
246. Id. at 528-29. The trial judge held the statute constitutional and found the newspaper
negligent per se for violating state statute. Id.
247. Id. at 529.
248. Id. at 533.
249. Id. (citing Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (holding that absent a
compelling state interest, state governments may not punish the press for publishing truthful
information that was lawfully obtained)).
250. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
251. Daily Mail, 433 U.S. at 97.
252. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (citing Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at
103)).




generally concerned a matter of public significance, as the occurrence and
investigation of a crime were "of paramount public import."255
The Court assessed whether imposing liability on the newspaper was
necessary to further a compelling state interest.256 The Court acknowledged
the existence of such vital concerns as the privacy of complainants, their
physical safety, and the goal of increased reporting of rape. 257 The Court
found three countervailing reasons not to impose liability in this case.258
First, the Court cited the manner in which the information had been
provided. 259 The government had failed "to police itself' in providing this
information.260 Imposing liability on the media for publishing the infor-
mation was held not to be an effective means of ensuring anonymity for
crime victims. 261 Further, The Florida Star had relied on a routine "news
release" to obtain this information. 262 If liability were imposed, the media
would no longer rely on government news releases, and self-censorship of
the media could result.263
The negligence per se standard created a second reason not to impose
liability.264 An automatic finding of liability could be inappropriate in some
cases, such as where the victim's identity was already widely known, she
had voluntarily called attention to the crime, or was otherwise a "reasonable
subject of public concern" for reasons such as prior false allegations. 265
Additionally, the Court held that the per se standard imposed no scienter
requirement. 266
Finally, the Court found that Florida's statute prohibiting publication of
rape victims' identities was so "facially underinclusive" that it did not
appear to ensure their anonymity. 267 The statute prohibited publication only
in an "instrument of mass communication," but did not address other means
255. Id. at 536-37.
256. Id. at 537.
257. Id.
258. Id.





264. Id. at 539.
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266. Id. The lack of a scienter, or knowledge requirement, created the "perverse result"
whereby truthful publications received less protection under negligence per se than "defamatory
falsehoods" received under an ordinary negligence standard. Id.
267. Id. at 540.
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of transmission. 268 Even a malicious gossip would be free to spread such
information, with potentially devastating consequences for the victim.2 69
The Court stated that its holding in Florida Star "[was] limited."270 It
did not afford automatic constitutional protection to all truthful publi-
cation. 271 It did not hold that a state "may never punish a publication of the
name of a victim of a sexual offense." 272 The Court advised that it did "not
rule out the possibility that, in a proper case, imposing civil sanctions...
might be so overwhelmingly necessary to advance [state] interests as to
satisfy the Daily Mail standard."2 73 This ambiguous holding has not been
tested by further Supreme Court case law.
The possibility that extrajudicial privacy protections for rape
complainants could be crafted and enforced without infringing on the
freedom of the press was more recently considered at the state level by the
South Carolina Supreme Court.274 The court declined, in Dorman v.
Aiken,275 to hold facially unconstitutional its state statute criminalizing
publication of a rape complainant's name. 276 In Dorman, the complainant's
name had not been revealed to the press by law enforcement or court
records. 277 A reporter working for the defendant newspaper obtained the
complainant's name through private sources. 278 The Aiken Standard
published a front-page article about the gunpoint rape and revealed the
name of Joyce Dorman, the complainant.2 79
Dorman sued the Standard's corporate owner on multiple grounds
including violation of the statute criminalizing the publication of such
identity information. 280 The defendant argued that the statute was facially
unconstitutional as a violation of Equal Protection grounds because of its
apparent application only to print media.281 However, the court held that
268. Id. at 540-41.
269. Id. at 540.
270. Id. at 541.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 537.
274. Dorman v. Aiken Communications, Inc., 398 S.E.2d 687, 687 (S.C. 1990).
275. 398 S.E.2d 687 (S.C. 1990).
276. Dorman, 398 S.E.2d at 689. The statute made it a misdemeanor to publish or cause to
be published "the name of any person upon whom the crime of criminal sexual conduct has been
committed or alleged to have been committed in this State in any newspaper, magazine, or other
publication .... The provisions of this section shall not apply to publications made by order of
court." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-730 (Law. Co-op. 1985).







"publication" had long been construed broadly to mean dissemination by
various means, such as radio. 282
The defendant was equally unprevailing in its First Amendment
argument.283 The court stated that it would follow the United States
Supreme Court's example in Florida Star and decline to address the facial
constitutionality of the statute. 284 Instead, the court emphasized the need to
scrutinize the discrete factual context of each case where the statute might
apply.285
IV. CONCLUSION
Rape shields, now common in the United States, reflect varied
approaches to resolving the tension between legitimate, competing
interests.286 Every state and the federal government have responded to the
need to balance state interests of increased reporting and prosecution of
rape, complainant privacy interests, and a defendant's right to an effective
defense. 287 But rape shields are not static or absolute; they are subject to
legislative amendment and judicial interpretation. The courts, given the dif-
ficult task of applying the shields, occasionally find that it is the shield that
must yield to a defendant's constitutional rights.288
While rape shields are a visible result of efforts to reform rape law, it is
difficult to gauge their true impact.289 Little empirical research has been
conducted to study the impact of rape shields, especially in recent years. 290
However, shield protections are most frequently extended to the minority of
complainants, those alleging "stranger rape." 291 This may reflect an un-
willingness of the criminal justice system to adhere to the spirit of rape
shields.292 It may also reflect the fact that the courts are struggling to apply
rape shields in acquaintance cases where reasonable fact finders can reach
differing conclusions. The dividing line between flirtation and sexual
282. Id.
283. Id. at 688-89.
284. Id. (citing The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989)).
285. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court has held that when a complainant defended herself by
shooting and killing her armed attacker, this act of justifiable homicide made her an object of
legitimate public interest and ended her right to privacy. Macon Tel. Publ.'g Co. v. Tatum, 436
S.E.2d 655, 658 (Ga. 1993).
286. Tuerkheimer, supra note 19, at 1246-47.
287. State v. Garron, 827 A.2d 243, 265 n.l (N.J. 2003) (Coleman, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 261.
289. SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 15, at 29.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 155.
292. Id.
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conduct evidencing consent can occasionally appear so fine as to be
indistinguishable.
293
Evidentiary protections alone are insufficient to address the privacy
needs of rape complainants. 294 Empirical studies have shown that rape
complainants oppose publication of information that publicly identifies
them.295 Publication of such information may in turn discourage reporting
of rape.296 These concerns are heightened by changes in the way traditional
media and emerging communications tools, such as the Internet,
disseminate information regarding rape and rape trials.297
The few Supreme Court opinions on point have indicated that
publication of this information is not automatically protected by First
Amendment rights.298 The Court's holding in Florida Star sets out ex-
plicitly the concerns that a prohibition on publication of identifying
information must meet, such as facial inclusiveness.299
The Court's concern that such a proscription be applied evenly to all
sources of such information is especially relevant today. 300 The Court dis-
cussed in detail the possibility of a malicious gossip disseminating such
information. 30 1 The consequences, it noted, could be "devastating." 302 The
Court's opinion predated many of the changes in media coverage of rape,
and did not address Internet publication of detailed biographical
information, photographs, and contact information about a rape com-
plainant.303 Such sites serve as the malicious gossip of the new information
age. They raise urgent questions about extrajudicial privacy protections,
and in the face of the ambiguity left by Florida Star, point to a gap in the
law that continues to widen with every improvement in communications
technology. 304
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